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Abstract
Self-reporting schemes have become a substantial part of law enforcement. This
paper analyzes the optimal use of such schemes when the authority cannot
commit to an ex post investigation effort. I show that this leads to a negative
relationship between self-reporting incentives and investigation effort. Three
main conclusions arise. First, violators self-report with a probability of 1 if and
only if full amnesty is offered. Second, self-reporting schemes are not efficient
when the level of harm of the act is high. Finally, authorities can increase the
incentives to self-report when they convict without hard evidence. However, a
hard-evidence standard provides more deterrence and is weakly welfare superior.
1. Introduction
In the last 2 decades, there has been a significant increase in the use of self-
reporting schemes by government agencies and private organizations. Self-
reporting schemes encourage individuals and corporations to report harmful
behavior to an enforcement authority in exchange for a reduced sanction. The
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA’s) self-disclosure policy provides
for a 100 percent reduction in punitive fines when firms promptly disclose and
correct self-discovered violations.1 In the Antitrust Division, the U.S. Department
of Justice (DOJ) introduced a new corporate leniency program in 1993, awarding
automatic and complete amnesty to the first cartel member that self-reports
before a cartel investigation has started. The program triggered an unprecedented
number of reported and prosecuted cartels, which led the European Union and
1 Reporting firms remain liable for fines related to the economic benefit from their violation. See
Pfaff and Sanchirico (2004) for more details and an empirical evaluation of this policy.
I would like to thank Richard Holden, a second editor, an anonymous referee, and participants
at various conferences and seminars for their helpful comments.
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over 50 jurisdictions worldwide to adopt similar programs.2 To enforce the U.S.
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), the DOJ and the Securities and Exchange
Commission have announced more generous fine reductions for voluntary dis-
closure of corruption-related activities.3 In 2012, the U.S. Internal Revenue Ser-
vice opened its third Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program (after previous
programs in 2009 and 2011), which offers a fine reduction of approximately 50
percent for taxpayers who report their previously undisclosed foreign accounts
and assets. The Federal Aviation Authority initiated in 2008 the Air Traffic Safety
Action Program as a voluntary, nonpunitive self-reporting program to encourage
air traffic employees to report safety violations.
In two important papers, Kaplow and Shavell (1994) and Malik (1993) analyze
the optimal design of self-reporting programs and argue that such schemes are
a powerful enforcement tool. The argument is as follows. A violator has an
incentive to self-report a harmful act if the authority proposes a reduced sanction
that equals (or is slightly less than) the expected value of not reporting, that is,
the stipulated sanction times the probability of apprehension and prosecution.
This policy ensures that individuals who commit the act self-report in equilib-
rium, whereas the authority audits (investigates) nonoffenders with a positive
probability. Thus, for a given audit probability, self-reporting permits the au-
thority to save on costly auditing, while the individual’s expected return from
the act and deterrence are the same as without self-reporting. It follows that the
use of self-reporting always strictly increases welfare.4 The crux of this argument
is that the enforcement authority is able to commit beforehand to an ex post
investigation effort. This assumption is essential since the optimal enforcement
effort is not time consistent. Ex ante, the optimal investigation effort is the one
that induces an offender to self-report. However, when all offenders self-report,
the authority faces, ex post, individuals who knowingly have not committed the
crime. Hence, the authority is best off not investigating at all and reallocating
scarce enforcement resources to other tasks. In this paper, I relax this commit-
ment assumption and show that with time-consistent enforcement effort the
authority faces a trade-off between inducing self-reporting and maintaining de-
terrence, which significantly limits the scope for the efficient use of self-reporting
programs.
Consider the model of Kaplow and Shavell (1994) and suppose that the au-
thority is unable to commit ex ante to an investigation effort and decides on an
investigation effort after the individual’s choice not to self-report. In the absence
of a report, the authority does not know whether she is facing an individual who
2 Miller (2009) provides some empirical support that the introduction of the program increased
the Department of Justice’s cartel detection capabilities. See Spagnolo (2008) for a comprehensive
discussion of different leniency programs.
3 In a recent case, Pfizer received a 34 percent reduction off the bottom of the fine range for U.S.
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act violations recommended in the sentencing guidelines (see U.S. De-
partment of Justice 2012).
4 These papers also show that self-reporting programs lead to further efficiency gains when in-
dividuals are risk averse and when imprisonment is available as costly punishment.
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has committed the act and has not reported it or an individual who has not
committed the act. The authority weighs the expected benefit of avoiding a type
II error (acquitting a violator) against the cost of investigation. Her optimal
investigation effort thus decreases both the self-reporting rate of the individual
and the deterrence of the act. These negative relationships feed back into the
incentives to self-report and the optimal design of the self-reporting program.
First, the equilibrium self-reporting rate increases with the generosity of the self-
reporting scheme. However, violators report with a probability of 1 if and only
if the authority gives full amnesty. Similarly, if the program is not sufficiently
lenient, there is no self-reporting at all. Second, ex ante, when the authority
chooses the optimal self-reporting scheme, she faces a trade-off between inducing
self-reporting and deterring the harmful act. A more lenient scheme strengthens
the threat of investigation and the incentives to self-report but, at the same time,
weakens deterrence. As a consequence, the use of self-reporting schemes is ef-
ficient if and only if the harm of the act is sufficiently small. When the harm
of the act is significant and deterrence more valuable, the authority is best off
not proposing a self-reporting scheme.
These results are derived under the assumption that the authority prosecutes
only if and when the investigation is successful and yields hard evidence to
convict the violator. Alternatively, the second part of this paper analyzes the
effects of a lower evidentiary standard under which the authority is able to convict
if—after an inconclusive investigation—the expected cost of conviction is lower
than the expected cost of acquittal. I show that such a standard is able to
strengthen the incentives to self-report. However, the hard evidence provides
more investigation incentives and stronger deterrence and is weakly welfare
superior.
This paper contributes to a growing literature on self-reporting and law en-
forcement. Following the work of Kaplow and Shavell (1994) and Malik (1993),
several papers have identified further benefits of self-reporting programs. For
example, self-reporting programs reduce the incentives of violators to engage in
costly avoidance activities to prevent apprehension (Innes 2001). When violators
have heterogeneous apprehension probabilities, self-reporting schemes are able
to provide more targeted deterrence to different types of violators (Innes 2000).
Self-reporting and self-policing also increase the frequency of ex post cleanup
and/or remediation, as self-reporting firms always clean up whereas nonreporting
firms remediate only when they are caught (Innes 1999a, 1999b). A similar
argument is made in the context of compliance activities in Livernois and Mc-
Kenna (1999).
A related, recent strand of literature analyzes self-reporting when there is a
group of wrongdoers, such as firms in a price-fixing cartel or members of or-
ganized crime. Two additional features emerge with respect to law enforcement
in this context.5 The governance of the group has to ensure cooperation by all
5 See Choi and Gerlach (forthcoming) for a discussion of the economic effects of leniency programs
and a current summary of the growing experimental literature on self-reporting programs in antitrust.
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members, and self-reporting might exert negative externalities among groupmem-
bers and lead to prisoner’s dilemmas. These issues are explored in the framework
of generic law enforcement by Buccirossi and Spagnolo (2006) and in the context
of cartel formation by Motta and Polo (2003), Spagnolo (2004), Aubert, Rey,
and Kovacic (2006), and Harrington (2008). In all of these papers, with single
or multiple wrongdoers, either the authority is able to commit to an investigation
effort ex ante or the prosecution probability is exogenous.
By contrast, issues arising from a lack of commitment have been studied
extensively in the literature on costly auditing. For instance, the tax audit lit-
erature studies optimal policies to induce individuals to truthfully report their
income. One approach assumes that the authority is able to commit to a tax
scheme and an audit schedule ex ante (Reinganum and Wilde 1985; Border and
Sobel 1987; Mookherjee and Png 1989). Such a commitment enables the au-
thority to directly impose the optimal policy, and the audit probability declines
with reported income to prevent high-income taxpayers from underreporting
too much. The alternative approach assumes that the authority can commit to
a tax scheme but not to audit probabilities (Reinganum and Wilde 1986; Graetz,
Reinganum, and Wilde 1986; Melumad and Mookherjee 1989; Chatterjee, Mor-
ton, and Mukherji 2008). In this case, the taxpayers’ equilibrium reporting strat-
egy has to adjust to provide the authority with incentives to implement a de-
creasing audit schedule. Hence, the equilibrium amount of underreporting has
to decrease with the true income of taxpayers. In a related study, Khalil (1997)
introduces audits without commitment in a standard principal-agent problem
with adverse selection. In the optimal contract, the principal increases the output
of the low-cost type to raise his stake in an audit and strengthen his incentives
to audit ex post. A similar argument is made in Khalil and Parigi (1998), in
which a lender increases the loan size to mitigate the lack of commitment at
the ex post audit stage. The present paper shares the feature that, without com-
mitment, incentives for investigation have to arise endogenously in equilibrium.
The structure of the problem and the mechanism are, however, very different.
One key difference is that the self-reporting literature considers not only an
adverse-selection problem (with respect to the individual’s benefits) but also
moral hazard (with respect to whether the individual commits the socially harm-
ful act). Thus, the authority is concerned not only with the individual’s reporting
strategy but also with the policy effects on ex ante deterrence. In particular, this
paper shows that in the absence of commitment, the authority faces a negative
relationship between self-reporting incentives and deterrence.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the model under the two
alternative evidentiary standards. Section 3 briefly derives the optimal self-
reporting program with commitment. Section 4 analyzes the equilibrium and
optimal policy when the authority is unable to commit to the investigation effort
ex ante. Section 5 compares the approaches and discusses the role of commitment
and conditions under which commitment is more or less likely in practice.
This content downloaded from 130.102.42.98 on Wed, 26 Feb 2014 18:57:36 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Self-Reporting 1065
Section 6 considers self-reporting with a weaker evidentiary standard, while
Section 7 concludes. All formal proofs are in the Appendix.
2. The Model
A risk-neutral individual chooses to commit ( ) or not to commitc p 1
( ) an act that causes a social harm ( ). The associated (potential) privatec p 0 h 1 0
benefit b is private information and distributed according to a continuous density
function f(b) and a cumulative distribution function F(b). These distributions
are common knowledge.6
The authority does not observe whether the act has been committed by the
individual. To either convict ( ) or acquit ( ) the individual, she hasd p 1 d p 0
two instruments, a self-reporting program and procedural investigation. The
self-reporting scheme specifies that if the individual admits to the harmful act
( ), he is convicted but receives a reduced sanction . If the individualr p 1 R ≥ 0
does not self-report ( ) and is subsequently convicted, he pays the full,r p 0
stipulated sanction of . A self-report is verifiable by the authority, as vi-S ≥ R
olators always produce a credible report, whereas innocent individuals never do.
For the analysis, it will be useful to let denote the probability with0 ≤ r ≤ 1
which a violator self-reports the act. The parameters (R, S) of the self-reporting
program are chosen by the authority at the beginning of the game. The maximum
sanction is exogenously determined by a wealth constraint or the availabilityS¯
of rewards and punishments for the individual.
In the absence of a self-report, the authority opens an investigation before
making a judgment. In the course of an investigation, the authority detects the
true state of the world with a probability of e. With the remainingc  {0, 1}
probability of , the authority continues to be uninformed.7 The cost of an1 e
investigation with success rate e is C(e), with , , and′ ′ ′C(0) p 0 C (e) ≥ 0 C (e) ≥
. Two alternative timings are considered with respect to the authority’s choice of0
investigation effort. As a benchmark, Section 3 considers the case in which the
authority can commit to an investigation effort at the beginning of the game. The
remainder of the paper considers situations in which the authority is unable to
commit and chooses her effort ex post.
The payoff of the authority is as follows. The authority values a correct acquittal
or conviction at a normalized payoff of 0. The cost of committing an error of
type I, that is, convicting an innocent individual, is . This includes theE 1 01
cost of the sanction of the individual, loss of income, stigma, or loss to society
from a miscarriage of justice. Similarly, the cost of committing an error of type
II, that is, acquitting a guilty individual, is . This includes any potentialE 1 02
6 The setup follows the standard model of probabilistic law enforcement; see Polinsky and Shavell
(2000) and Garoupa (1997) for surveys.
7 This structure of costly information collection follows the model of Dewatripont and Tirole
(1999).
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Table 1
Payoff Matrix
d p 0 d p 1
c p 0 0 E1
c p 1 E2 0
future harm of leaving the act unpunished.8 The payoff matrix as a function of
the state of the world and the decision is shown as Table 1.
The authority is risk neutral and maximizes ex ante expected total welfare,
that is, the sum of the individual’s net surplus plus the authority’s payoff minus
the cost of investigation. The following parameter restrictions are imposed to
ensure an interior solution for the investigation effort:
′ ′C (0) ! E ! C (1) Gi  {1, 2}.i
If an investigation remains inconclusive, the authority’s judgment depends on
the evidentiary standard in place. In the first part of the paper, the authority
uses a hard-evidence standard. Under this standard, the authority convicts if
and only if the investigation is successful and the authority can infer with a
probability of 1 that the individual has committed the act. Conversely, if the
investigation is inconclusive, the individual is acquitted. In Section 6, I consider
the effects of a weaker evidence standard. The authority convicts the individual
if the expected cost of conviction is lower than the expected cost of acquittal.
This means that she always convicts after a successful investigation and she may
convict when the investigation effort was not conclusive but the probability of
facing a violator is high.
Figure 1 summarizes the timing of the game when the authority (A) is unable
to commit to her investigation effort. First, she chooses the parameters of the
self-reporting program (R, S). Then, nature draws the individual’s (I’s) benefit
b and he chooses whether to commit the act. The individual self-reports the act
with a probability of r, in which case he incurs a reduced sanction R. If there
is no self-report, the authority chooses an investigation intensity of e and then
makes a judgment. If convicted, the individual pays the full sanction S.
Although the analysis is framed within the standard law enforcement model,
this setup readily applies to some of the examples discussed above. For instance,
the authority could be an environmental agency with incomplete information
about the cost of compliance of firms where the harmful act is to disrupt com-
pliance. In a tax context, the violation could be to illegally transfer assets overseas
when the tax authority has incomplete information about an individual’s cost
of doing so. Similarly, this framework could encompass employers monitoring
harmful activities of employees within an organization or an antitrust authority
prosecuting anticompetitive practices of firms.
8 See Andreoni (1991) for a similar payoff structure in a different context.
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Figure 1. Timeline
3. Self-Reporting Programs with Commitment
As a benchmark, suppose that the authority can commit to her investigation
effort at the beginning of the game and she adopts the hard-evidence standard;
that is, she can convict only when an investigation is successful. Here the setup
differs from Kaplow and Shavell (1994) in only two aspects. First, the authority
incurs a cost when making type I or II errors. This ensures that, in the absence
of commitment, the authority has an ex post incentive to investigate in order
to avoid convicting an innocent individual or acquitting a violator. As seen below,
these costs do not alter the qualitative results of Kaplow and Shavell (1994) as,
in equilibrium, all violators self-report and there are no errors in judgment.
Naturally, as E1 and E2 go to 0, this assumption coincides with Kaplow and
Shavell (1994). The second difference is that instead of a linear effort cost, a
more general function C(e) is assumed.
With ex ante commitment, the authority chooses a policy scheme (R, S, e).
The individual learns his benefit and decides whether to commit the act. If an
individual self-reports, the authority is certain to face a violator and convicts
the individual. In the absence of a self-report, the authority starts an investigation
with a probability of e. A violator chooses to self-report (not to self-report) if
the reduced fine R is strictly lower (higher) than his expected sanction eS. The
probability of self-reporting is thus governed by9
p 1 if R ! eS,
r  [0, 1] if R p eS, (1){p 0 if R 1 eS.
An individual is investigated and potentially sanctioned independent of the
benefit he obtains from the act. Therefore, in equilibrium, there exists a marginal
individual with who is indifferent between committing or not, while allB ≥ 0
individuals with commit the harmful act. Thus, the threshold value forb ≥ B
the marginal violator, or the level of deterrence, is given by
9 The notation means that the violator is indifferent to any reporting probability betweenr  [0, 1]
0 and 1.
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B p min {R, eS}. (2)
The ex ante welfare net of the cost of investigation and the cost of committing
type II errors is given by

W (e, B, r) p (b h)f(b)db [1 F(B)](1 r)(1 e)E1  2
B (3)
 {[1 F(B)](1 r) F(B)}C(e).
The first term is the expected net benefit, private gain minus social harm, when
the individual commits the act. The second term is the expected loss when the
individual commits the act, does not self-report, and is not convicted by the
authority. The last term is the expected cost of investigating nonreporting vio-
lators or innocent individuals.
The authority maximizes ex ante welfare subject to equations (1) and (2).
Inducing self-reporting with values such that is not optimal, as the sameR ! eS
outcome could be achieved with less investigation effort. Setting impliesR 1 eS
that there is no self-reporting and is equivalent to and . Thus,R p eS r p 0
suppose and consider ex ante welfare. Increasing the self-reportingR p eS p B
probability r always raises welfare independent of the level of investigation effort
or deterrence. Self-reporting reduces the probability of making type II errors,
and it saves the cost of investigation for self-reporting individuals. Hence, it is
optimal to induce self-reporting with a probability of 1. Given that all individuals
self-report, the optimal stipulated sanction, S, is maximal, and the investigation
effort can be used to optimally adjust ex ante deterrence. The optimal effort
satisfies for , ordW /de p 0 r p 11
′¯F(eS)C (e)¯h eS p C(e) , (4)¯ ¯Sf(eS)
which equates the marginal gain from avoiding net harm and the cost of in-
vestigating the marginal and the inframarginal innocent individuals. Thus, the
commitment benchmark can be summarized as follows.
Proposition 1. If the authority can commit to an investigation effort ex ante,
she induces self-reporting from a violator with a probability of 1. The use of
self-reporting programs is always socially efficient.
In the presence of effort commitment, self-reporting programs are a powerful
enforcement instrument. The policy parameters can be chosen to induce self-
reporting from violators, while the investigation effort can be used to fine-tune
the deterrence of the act. The use of a self-reporting scheme is always optimal
independent of the parameter values of the model such as the harm of the act
or the cost of errors in judgment.
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4. Self-Reporting Programs without Commitment
For the remainder of the paper, I assume that the authority is unable to commit
to her investigation effort. First, I derive the equilibrium outcome for a given
self-reporting scheme (R, S). Then I characterize the authority’s optimal self-
reporting scheme.
4.1. Equilibrium Analysis
Without ex ante commitment, the game follows the timeline in Figure 1. The
authority introduces a self-reporting policy scheme (R, S). The individual learns
his benefit, and all types commit the act. If an individual self-reports, theb ≥ B
authority is certain to face a violator and convicts the individual. In the absence
of a self-report, the authority decides how much investigation effort to exert.
The incentive to investigate depends on how likely it is that she is able to convict
a violator and avoid a type II enforcement error. The authority faces either an
innocent individual or a violator who has not turned himself in. Her posterior
belief g that the individual is guilty is thus defined as
Pr {r p 0Fb ≥ B}
g p . (5)
Pr {r p 0Fb ≥ B}Pr {b ! B}
The optimal investigation effort e solves and minimizesmin (1 e)gE  C(e)e 2
the expected loss from exerting effort and making type II errors. The first-order
condition for optimal effort is
[1 F(B)](1 r)E 2 ′p C (e). (6)
[1 F(B)](1 r) F(B)
Increasing effort reduces the probability of acquitting a violator. The expected
marginal gain (or avoided loss) from this is the posterior belief of facing a
nonreporting violator g times the cost of making an error of type II. In an
optimum, the marginal gain equates the marginal cost of exerting effort. Since
the latter is increasing in e, the optimal effort increases in the posterior belief
g. This leads to the following relationship between investigation effort and de-
terrence and self-reporting. First, ceteris paribus, the authority’s belief of facing
a violator decreases in the self-reporting rate r. When the violator never self-
reports, the belief is at its highest level of , whereas for theg p 1 F(B) r p 1
authority’s belief is 0. Hence, the more that violators self-report, the lower the
optimal investigation effort. Second, for a given self-reporting rate, an increase
in deterrence, that is, a higher B, leads to a lower posterior belief. This implies
that the authority investigates less when there is more ex ante deterrence.
A violator anticipates the optimal effort of the authority if he is not revealing,
and self-reporting follows condition (1). An individual commits the act if his
private benefit b exceeds the expected sanction. Thus, the threshold value for the
marginal violator is given by equation (2). Hence, for a given policy (R, S), the
equilibrium outcome (e*, B*, r*) is determined by equations (1), (2), and (6).
This content downloaded from 130.102.42.98 on Wed, 26 Feb 2014 18:57:36 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
1070 The Journal of LAW& ECONOMICS
First, consider the case in which the violator’s reduced penalty R is strictly
less than the expected sanction eS when he is not self-reporting. This condition
requires that the authority exert a strictly positive amount of effort and that
violators always self-report. These two actions, however, are not compatible. If
violators self-report with a probability of 1, then—following condition (6)—the
authority ascribes the absence of a self-report to the fact that the individual is
not guilty and does not exert investigation effort. Hence, this condition cannot
hold in an equilibrium. Next, consider situations with such that violatorsR 1 eS
never self-report. Deterrence is determined by the marginal, nonreporting vi-
olator at . The optimal investigation effort follows from condition (6)B* p e*S
for , where and is implicitly defined by¯ ¯r p 0 e* p e e
′¯ ¯[1 F(eS)]E p C (e).2
Since the investigation effort is decreasing in r, the investigation effort is thee¯
maximum investigation intensity for a given sanction S. In this equilibrium,
both ex ante deterrence and the optimal investigation effort are independent of
R. Conversely, an increase in the stipulated sanction S deters more individuals
and lowers the optimal investigation effort. This equilibrium exists if and only
if the authority’s policy is not sufficiently generous relative to the maximum
investigation effort, that is, if , where R′ denotes the cutoff value.′ ¯R 1 R { eS
Finally, suppose that . In this case, a violator is indifferent and self-R p eS
reports with a probability of . This requires the optimal investigationr  [0, 1]
effort to be equal to the ratio of the reduced sanction over the full sanction,
. Accordingly, the marginal individual is at . To sustain thise* p R/S B* p R
equilibrium, the optimal self-reporting probability has to adjust and equate the
marginal gain and cost of effort in equation (6). This yields the equilibrium self-
reporting rate
′C (R/S)F(R)
r* p 1 . (7)′[E  C (R/S)][1 F(R)]2
In order to verify under which condition this equilibrium exists, consider the
effect of the policy parameters (R, S) on the equilibrium self-reporting rate.
Figure 2 illustrates an increase in the reduced penalty from R0 to R1. Raising
R increases deterrence and reduces the authority’s posterior belief that she faces
a violator. This shifts down the marginal gain of effort in equation (6). At the
same time, a higher value of R increases the investigation effort e*, which leads
to a higher marginal cost. Both effects imply that a higher value of R (that is,
a less lenient policy) strictly reduces equilibrium self-reporting. Moreover, the
self-reporting probability is nonnegative if and only if . At exactly this′R ≤ R
threshold, the self-reporting probability is 0, and the equilibrium coincides with
the one characterized for . For higher values of R, this equilibrium failsR 1 eS
to exist. By contrast, since r* is strictly decreasing in R and , itr*(R p 0) p 1
holds that a violator self-reports with a probability of 1 if and only if the authority
gives full amnesty.
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Figure 2. Effect of an increase from R0 to R1 on the equilibrium self-reporting rate
Further note that the second policy parameter S affects only the equilibrium
investigation effort. A higher value of S reduces the investigation effort and the
marginal cost of effort. Thus, self-reporting is strictly increasing in the stipulated
sanction.
Lemma 1. For a given policy scheme (R, S), two equilibrium regimes arise:
(i) If the policy is sufficiently lenient ( ), the equilibrium self-reporting′R ≤ R
rate is given by equation (7) and the investigation effort is R/S. The self-reporting
probability strictly decreases in R and increases in S.
(ii) Otherwise, violators never self-report and the investigation effort is .e¯
The effectiveness of the self-reporting program hinges on the amount of am-
nesty the authority gives. If the scheme is not sufficiently lenient, self-reporting
never occurs, and the authority has to rely on her investigation efforts. If the
fine reduction is sufficiently generous, the self-reporting rate increases in the
amount of leniency, while the optimal investigation effort decreases. However,
at the same time, more leniency induces more individuals to commit the act.
This introduces a trade-off between ex ante deterrence and ex post self-reporting,
which is crucial to the choice of the optimal self-reporting program in Section
4.2.
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4.2. The Optimal Self-Reporting Program
The authority chooses a self-reporting scheme (R, S) to maximize ex ante
welfareW1(e, B, r) as defined in equation (3). Each policy parameter pair induces
an equilibrium outcome from one of the two regimes in lemma 1. Let (R,W *1
S) denote the ex ante welfare with the equilibrium values (e*, B*, r*). Formally,
the authority maximizes (R, S) subject to and . Note that¯W * 0 ≤ R ≤ S 0 ≤ S ≤ S1
we can focus on the indirect effect of R and S on welfare via the self-reporting
rate r* and the deterrence level B*. It follows from an envelope theorem argument
that the policy parameters do not affect welfare through the optimal investigation
effort. The reason for this is that the direct effect of e on welfare is conditional
on the authority not receiving a self-report and, thus, identical to its effect on
the authority’s objective at the interim stage.10
The authority has two policy options. Either she offers a sufficiently lenient
self-reporting scheme to induce a strictly positive self-reporting rate′R ≤ R (S)
and the equilibrium in lemma 1.i, or she refrains from using self-reports and
relies on her investigation efforts as in the equilibrium in lemma 1.ii. Next, I
will briefly describe the local maximizer for each regime and then give the globally
optimal policy. First, consider policy parameters that induce self-reporting. An
interior solution, , must satisfy′R*  [0, R )
dW *1 p [h R* (1 r*)(1 e*)E  r*C(e*)]f(R*)2dR (8)
r*
 [C(e*) (1 e*)E ][1 F(R*)] p 0.2
R
The degree of amnesty for self-reporting affects marginal deterrence and the self-
reporting rate of inframarginal violators. Increasing R raises the deterrence
threshold . The net welfare effect of this increase is given in squareB* p R
brackets in the first line of equation (8). Deterring the marginal individual
prevents social harm h and private benefit from the act equal to R*, lowers the
authority’s probability of making type II errors, and reduces potential cost savings
from self-reporting. At the same time, increasing R reduces the probability of
self-reporting and thus affects the social welfare from the inframarginal indi-
viduals who commit the act. A lower self-reporting rate increases the expected
cost of investigations and the probability of making type II errors. Hence, the
effect through the inframarginal violators is strictly negative, which mandates
strong leniency and an interior solution. However, this may be mitigated by the
effect of amnesty on deterrence. Deterrence is more valuable, the greater the
social harm of the act. From equation (8) it follows that if the value of h is
sufficiently high, then the positive deterrence effect outweighs the gains from
10 The effect of e on ex ante welfare is 0 in equilibrium since dW /de p [1 F(B*)] (11
is identical to equilibrium condition (6). Hence, the indirect′r*)E  {1 r*[1 F(B*)]}C (e*) p 02
effect of (R, S) via the optimal investigation effort can be ignored.
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self-reporting. In particular, there must exist a threshold value h′ such that for
greater social harm the slope is positive for all and the local maximizer′R ≤ R
is the corner solution. By contrast, if the social harm is sufficiently small, then
full amnesty is the local maximizer. To see this, note that as R approaches 0, the
self-reporting probability goes to 1 and the investigation effort goes to zero. In
the limit, the positive effect of deterrence is solely to prevent harm h, whereas
there is strictly positive gain frommarginally reducing R to increase self-reporting
from inframarginal violators. Thus, if h is sufficiently small, the slope in equation
(8) is always negative. From this argument also follows that the threshold value
h′ above which there is a local corner solution, , has to be strictly positive.′R* p R
To conclude the characterization of this local maximum, note that the optimal
stipulated sanction is always maximal since
W * r*1 p [1 F(R)][(1 e*)E  C(e*)] 1 0. (9)2
S S
The stipulated sanction S does not affect deterrence, but it increases the prob-
ability of self-reporting. This, in turn, saves enforcement cost by reducing type
II errors and by lowering the frequency of investigations.
Next, consider policy parameters such that the equilibrium in point′R 1 R (S)
ii of lemma 1 results. In this equilibrium, a violator does not self-report and
the reduced sanction R has no impact on welfare. The first-order condition for
an interior solution, , is¯S* ! S
W * e*1 p [h e*S* (1 e*)E ]f(e*S*) e* S* p 0, (10)2 ( )S S*
whereas if for all . The sanction S affects only the¯ ¯S* p S W */S ≥ 0 S ≤ S1
position of the marginal violator, . A higher value of S increases thisB p eS
threshold by the last term in equation (10). The effect of more deterrence on
welfare is given by the term in square brackets, which sums the net welfare
impact of the marginal violator, , and the gain from a reduction in theh e*S*
probability of making errors of type II. If the harm h is sufficiently great, then
increasing the stipulated sanction always increases welfare and . By con-¯S* p S
trast, for lower values of h, the optimal sanction in this local maximum is less
than maximal.11
It remains to compare the two local maximizers and derive the globally optimal
policy. I show in the Appendix that if an interior local maximum with R* !
exists, then it is always the global maximizer. Otherwise, the authority’s optimal′R
11 Note that in an interior solution it holds that . In other words, the authority isB* p e*S* 1 h
overdeterring the act in order to reduce the expected cost of making type II errors. For more details,
see the proof of proposition 2 in the Appendix.
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policy is not to induce self-reporting and impose a maximum sanction on con-
victed violators.12
Proposition 2. If the authority is unable to commit to her investigation effort,
the optimal policy can be described as follows:
(i) The authority uses self-reporting by violators if and only if the harm of
the act is sufficiently small ( ). For more harmful acts, the authority uses′h ! h
only procedural investigation.
(ii) The stipulated sanction is always maximal.
In the absence of commitment, self-reporting is part of the optimal law en-
forcement policy mix if and only if the level of external harm of the act is
sufficiently small. In order to induce self-reporting in the equilibrium of lemma
1.i, the authority needs to provide a generous policy scheme with a sufficient
wedge between reduced and stipulated penalties. However, this comes at the cost
of weakening the investigation effort and deterrence. Since deterrence is most
valuable when the level of external harm is high, it is exactly for those values
that the authority optimally implements the equilibrium of lemma 1.ii and re-
frains from the use of self-reporting in her enforcement strategy. Proposition 2
thus suggests a two-pronged approach in the design of self-reporting programs.
The disclosure of minor regulatory breaches should be encouraged by offering
(partial) amnesty from fines, whereas major violations of the law should be
exempt from such schemes in order to provide investigation incentives and
deterrence.
5. Self-Reporting and the Value of Commitment
The results in Section 4 are in marked contrast with those of the commitment
case in Section 3 and the work by Kaplow and Shavell (1994) and Malik (1993).
When the authority is able to commit to an ex post investigation effort, she is
able to choose her effort (and deterrence, since ) and the level of self-B p eS
reporting independently. For any level of investigation effort, the authority is
best off if she induces full self-reporting with the parameters of her policy scheme
( ). Given that all violators self-report, the authority then chooses theR p eS
optimal amount of effort (and deterrence). Hence, the use of self-reporting is
always beneficial, and the authority is required to investigate only the pool of
individuals who have not committed the act. By contrast, when the authority is
unable to commit, investigation effort (and deterrence) and self-reporting are
negatively related. Inducing self-reporting comes at the cost of reducing deter-
rence in order to strengthen the threat of ex post investigation. Hence, when
the level of external harm of the act is great, ex ante deterrence is more valuable
12 While, for certain parameter values, a less than maximal sanction might be part of the local
maximum without self-reporting, such a local maximizer is always dominated, for those parameter
values, by the local maximizer of the regime with self-reporting.
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than ex post self-reporting, and the authority prefers not to offer a self-reporting
scheme for violators.
It is nevertheless clear that the authority would always benefit from com-
mitment, as its lack imposes an additional constraint on her maximization prob-
lem. In fact, the benefits of commitment can be decomposed by comparing the
optimal solutions in Sections 3 and 4 for the same parameter values. At the
optimal no-commitment effort level, welfare is raised—as discussed in Section
3—by increasing the self-reporting rate to the commitment equilibrium level,
that is, to . Furthermore, with full self-reporting, welfare is maximized atr p 1
the effort level given in equation (4). Thus, the move from the no-commitment
to the commitment effort level further improves ex ante welfare.
These benefits raise the question as to how the authority could sustain com-
mitment to the optimal investigation effort. Several mechanisms have been dis-
cussed in the literature.13 The two most likely options in this context are re-
putational concerns via repeated interaction and budget investment. Many
enforcement situations are based on repeated interactions between an authority
and individuals. Suppose in a given period the authority announces the optimal
full commitment effort and all violators behave as in the equilibrium discussed
in Section 3. If, at the end of the period, the authority deviates and does not
investigate, individuals and the authority revert to the no-commitment equilib-
rium from the next period onward. Using such a strategy, the authority would
trade off the benefit from deviating (and saving investigation costs) with the
cost of losing commitment in the future. A major problem with this strategy is
that the optimal policy involves random investigations of innocent individuals,
which makes it hard for individuals to monitor the authority’s adherence to her
announced investigation effort.14 While the authority could possibly provide
aggregate information on her investigation efforts, such a communication policy
would face a similar credibility problem. However, without effective monitoring,
the repeated-game strategy is not sustainable or at least is only partially sus-
tainable. Hence, a necessary condition for sustaining commitment via reputation
is a high level of transparency of the investigation process. This is more likely
to be the case in situations in which the authority is supervising a small, stable,
and nonanonymous set of individuals over time, like a regional environmental
agency with a small number of big firms or a small department within an
organization. By contrast, in some of the other examples, like the antitrust
13 Outsourcing to a third party, as discussed in Melumad and Mookherjee (1989) and Picard
(1996), or delegation (Mookherjee and Png 1989) imply high transaction costs, and moral hazard
and commitment are limited, as there is the possibility of renegotiation. At least theoretically, the
authority could also post a bond, which she would forfeit if she were not to implement the announced
investigation policy.
14 There is another, more subtle theoretical issue with this mechanism, as the authority’s repeated-
game strategy is in itself not renegotiation proof in the sense of Farrell and Maskin (1989). After
deviating in one period, the authority could renegotiate and intend to reintroduce the full com-
mitment strategy. In other words, conceptually, the commitment problem might simply be pushed
back from the static to the repeated framework.
This content downloaded from 130.102.42.98 on Wed, 26 Feb 2014 18:57:36 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
1076 The Journal of LAW& ECONOMICS
leniency program, the FCPA, or tax amnesties, commitment seems to be much
harder to sustain.15 A second possible commitment device for the authority in
this context is to invest ex ante in her budget in order to reduce the cost of ex
post investigation. A lower marginal cost of investigation would increase the
incentives to exert effort and make self-reporting programs more beneficial.
However, from the comparative statics of my analysis, as long as the marginal
cost is bounded away from 0, the qualitative nature of the analysis without
commitment prevails. That is, self-reporting programs are not efficient when the
harm of the act is sufficiently high.
6. Optimal Evidence Standard and Self-Reporting
The analysis in Section 4 shows that, in the absence of commitment, the
authority faces a high cost of inducing violators to self-report. A pertinent ques-
tion in this context is whether the authority would be better off by lowering the
evidence standard for convictions in order to increase the threat of prosecution
for violators. In this section, I investigate the effects of a weaker evidence standard
on individuals’ self-reporting and solve for the optimal policy scheme. Then I
compare the results with those in Section 4 and derive the overall optimal
evidence standard.
6.1. Equilibrium Analysis
Suppose that the authority adopts a weaker evidence standard such that she
is able to convict the individual when the investigation is successful and when
the investigation is inconclusive but the expected cost of a conviction is lower
than the expected cost of an acquittal. This change in the evidentiary standard
affects the last stage of the self-reporting game. Consider the case in which the
individual does not self-report and the authority’s investigation efforts do not
provide hard evidence. Now the authority can either convict or acquit on the
basis of her belief g that the individual has committed the act. The authority
prefers to convict if the expected loss of convicting an innocent individual,
, is less than the expected loss of acquitting a violator, gE2. The authority(1 g)E1
is indifferent if , whereˆg p g
E1
gˆ {
E  E1 2
is the critical belief level. For higher values of g, the authority prefers to convict,
and for lower values she acquits the individual. The threshold value is higher
the more important the cost of type I errors is relative to type II errors. Let b
15 For example, when the U.S. Internal Revenue Service (IRS) launched its 2011 Offshore Voluntary
Disclosure Initiative, IRS commissioner Doug Shulman said, “This new disclosure initiative is the
last, best chance for people to get back into the system’’ (U.S. Internal Revenue Service 2011). On
January 9, 2012, the IRS announced another tax evasion amnesty scheme, the 2012 Voluntary
Disclosure Program.
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denote the probability of conviction without hard evidence; thus,
ˆp 0 if g ! g,
ˆb  [0, 1] if g p g, (11){p 1 otherwise.
In the absence of a self-report, the authority updates her belief g according to
equation (5) before exerting investigation effort. With a probability of e, she
discovers the true state of the world and makes a correct verdict. With the
remaining probability, she does not receive any additional information and con-
victs with a probability of b. Ex ante, the authority chooses the investigation
effort to minimize the cost of effort and ex post judgment errors, that is,
ming(1 e)(1 b)E  (1 g)(1 e)bE  C(e).2 1
e
The first-order condition for the optimal effort level, e**, satisfies
′(1 g)bE  g(1 b)E p C (e**). (12)1 2
The optimal investigation effort equates the expected marginal gain from avoid-
ing type I and type II errors and the marginal cost. Given the optimal conviction
rule from expression (11), the marginal gain is nonmonotonic in the posterior
belief g. For , the authority never convicts after an unsuccessful investi-ˆg ! g
gation and, ex ante, the authority exerts effort to minimize type II errors. Thus,
the marginal gain and the incentive to exert effort increase with the authority’s
belief that she faces a violator. By contrast, if the belief is beyond the critical
threshold, the expected cost of acquitting is high, and the authority always
convicts after an unsuccessful investigation. Hence, ex ante, the authority min-
imizes type I errors and exerts more effort the more likely it is that she is facing
an innocent individual, that is, the lower the value of g. Consequently, the
incentive to exert effort is strongest at the critical level, . At this threshold,ˆg p g
the expected costs of type I and type II errors are equal, and the conviction
probability b is irrelevant in the first-order condition. Evaluating condition (12)
at the critical value yields the implicit definition of the maximum effort levelgˆ
of the authority given this evidence standard,eˆ
′
ˆgˆE p C (e).2
Next consider the decision to self-report. A violator can be convicted in two
ways, by hard evidence or by a verdict based on suspicion. Thus, a violator
prefers (not) to self-report if the reduced sanction is less (more) than the expected
cost of facing investigation and possible conviction by the authority. He is in-
different if and only if
R p [e (1 e)b]S. (13)
At the same time, an individual commits the act if his private benefit b minus the
expected sanction exceeds the expected cost of conviction despite being innocent,
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bmin {R, [e (1 e)b]S} ≥ (1 e)bS.
Note that while raising the conviction probability b increases self-reporting in-
centives, it might not affect deterrence. Clearly, the possibility of a violator being
convicted without hard evidence increases deterrence. However, at the same time,
the individual who chooses not to commit the act faces the risk of being convicted
because of a type I error. When a violator has no strict incentive to self-report,
these effects cancel each other out, and deterrence does not depend on the
conviction probability. The threshold value for the marginal violator is
B p min {R (1 e)bS, eS}. (14)
I am now in a position to sketch the equilibrium when the authority is able
to convict without hard evidence.16 Let (e**, B**, r**, b**) denote the equilibrium
outcome for a given self-reporting policy (R, S). To simplify the exposition, I
restrict attention to the following condition:
¯¯ ˆ1 F(eS) ≥ g. (15)
When expression (15) does not hold, the authority never convicts after unsuc-
cessful investigations for any feasible policy scheme. The focus is thus on pa-
rameter values such that convictions without hard evidence might indeed be
optimal for the authority. This is the case when the maximum stipulated penalty
is relatively low compared with the cost of judgment errors.
First, consider an equilibrium in which the posterior belief of facing a violator
is small, , and the authority does not convict when the investigation isˆg ! g
unsuccessful. This corresponds to the analysis in Section 4.1, where this evidence
standard was imposed exogenously. As shown above, when the policy scheme
is sufficiently lenient, violators have an incentive to self-report. Thus, in the
absence of a self-report, the authority’s posterior belief of facing a violator is
low, and it is not optimal to convict without hard evidence. As R increases, there
is less self-reporting, and the equilibrium belief g increases as long as .′R ≤ R
For higher values, there is no self-reporting, and the belief is constant at a level
of . This has two implications for the existence of this equilibrium¯1 F(eS)
regime. First, if and only if expression (15) is satisfied, then the belief can reach
the critical level for convictions without hard evidence, that is, . Second, if thisgˆ
condition holds, then there must exist a threshold such that g is strictly′ ′ ′R ! R
less than if and only if . For these values, there are no convictions′ ′gˆ R ! R
without hard evidence, and the equilibrium follows lemma 1.i.
Next, consider the equilibrium in which the authority convicts with a strictly
positive probability after an unsuccessful investigation. It is clear that in such
an equilibrium the authority’s belief cannot be strictly above the critical threshold
. If this would be the case, then the authority would always convict withoutgˆ
hard evidence, and a violator would strictly prefer to self-report. This, however,
is not compatible with a posterior belief strictly below . Hence, the equilibriumgˆ
16 The formal proof for lemma 2 is in the Appendix.
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belief has to be exactly at the critical level such that the authority isˆg p g
indifferent between conviction and acquittal. The optimal investigation effort
then follows from equation (12), and the authority exerts the maximum effort
level, . Furthermore, the authority adjusts the threat of convictions with-ˆe** p e
out hard evidence in order to maintain the self-reporting incentives by satisfying
equation (13), that is,
ˆR eS
b** p . (16)
ˆ(1 e)S
Ceteris paribus, as R increases and self-reporting becomes less attractive, the
probability of conviction without hard evidence has to rise in order to preserve
the incentive to self-report. As R approaches S, the optimal conviction probability
goes to 1. By contrast, there is a strictly positive probability of conviction if and
only if the self-reporting scheme is not sufficiently lenient, that is, ′ ′R 1 R p
. Finally, the self-reporting rate has to be consistent with a posterior belief ateˆS
the critical level in order to provide an incentive to convict without hardgˆ
evidence. The optimal self-reporting rate thus follows from the definition of g
in equation (5), the optimal deterrence of from equation (14), andˆB** p eS
. This yieldsˆg p g
ˆ ˆ1 F(eS) g
r** p . (17)
ˆˆ [ ](1 g) 1 F(eS)
Since deterrence increases with S, the optimal self-reporting rate has to decrease
with S to maintain the same posterior belief. This equilibrium self-reporting
probability is strictly positive as long as condition (15) is satisfied. We can thus
summarize the equilibrium outcomes for a given self-reporting policy (R, S) as
follows.
Lemma 2. Suppose that condition (15) holds. Two equilibrium regimes arise:
(i) If the policy is sufficiently lenient ( ), the authority does not convict′ ′R ≤ R
without hard evidence and the equilibrium outcome from lemma 1.i obtains.
(ii) Otherwise, the equilibrium conviction follows equation (16), self-reporting
is given by equation (17), and the investigation effort is .eˆ
The differences between the equilibrium states with and without hard-evidence
convictions are discussed below. Three observations are noteworthy at this point.
First, even if the authority chooses a standard that allows her to convict without
hard evidence, it might still be optimal in equilibrium not to do so and rely on
hard evidence only. This occurs if the policy scheme is lenient and induces a
high self-reporting rate and a low probability of committing type II errors.
Second, with this weaker evidentiary standard, self-reporting always occurs with
a strictly positive probability for any feasible policy parameter pair (R, S). This
is due to the fact that an increase in R can be offset by raising the conviction
probability in order to satisfy the self-reporting constraint in equation (13).
Third, and related, if , then the equilibrium self-reporting rate, the in-′ ′R 1 R
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vestigation effort, and deterrence are independent of the policy parameter R.
The conviction probability b** increases in R but—as demonstrated in equation
(14)—does not affect deterrence of the act. At the same time, the investigation
effort is capped at such that the equilibrium belief is at its critical level . Thisˆ ˆe g
implies that both deterrence and the self-reporting rate are invariant in R for
any .′ ′R ≥ R
6.2. Optimal Self-Reporting Program
Consider the optimal self-reporting program when the authority is able to
convict without hard evidence. Ex ante welfare for a given vector (e, B, r, b) is

W (e, B, r, b) p (b h)f(b)db (1 F(B))(1 r)(1 e)(1 b)E2  2
B (18)
 F(B)(1 e)bE  [(1 F(B))(1 r) F(B)]C(e).1
The first term is the welfare contribution from marginal deterrence. The second
and third terms are the expected cost of acquitting a violator and convicting an
innocent individual, respectively. The last term is the expected cost of investi-
gating nonreporters. Ceteris paribus, there are two differences for total welfare
with a hard-evidence standard from equation (3). Convictions without hard
evidence reduce the probability of making type II errors by a factor of in1 b
the second term of equation (18). At the same time, they introduce the possibility
of making type I errors in the third term. Conversely, if there is no conviction
without hard evidence, , then ex ante welfare is equal to W1.b p 0
Let (R, S) denote the ex ante welfare with the equilibrium values (e**, B**,W *2
r**, b**). The authority maximizes this ex ante welfare with respect to (R, S).
The policy parameters induce one of the two equilibrium regimes described in
lemma 2. For values , the authority convicts only with hard evi-′ ′R  [0, R (S)]
dence, and the same equilibrium and welfare obtain as in lemma 1.i. From the
analysis in Section 4.2, it follows that the local maximizer is at , whereas¯S** p S
the optimal R is determined by condition (8). As the optimal reduced penalty
strictly increases in the harm h, there must exist a cutoff value for the harm,
denoted h′′, below which an interior solution exists, whereas for′ ′ ¯R** ! R (S)
higher values there is a corner solution. Moreover, since the upper bound of
the regime is lower under the weaker evidence standard, , the harm′ ′ ′R (S) ! R (S)
cutoff value for interior solutions must be lower, too; that is, . This′ ′ ′h ! h
observation is useful when comparing the evidence standards.17
The authority compares the above local maximizer with the one for R 
, where there is a strictly positive probability that the authority convicts′ ′(R (S), S]
after an unsuccessful investigation. In this equilibrium, the reduced penalty R
affects the equilibrium (and ex ante welfare) only through the conviction prob-
17 Put differently, there exist intermediate values of the harm such that the local maximizer with
the hard-evidence standard is interior, , whereas the local maximizer with the′ ′ ′R  (R (S), R (S))
lower evidence standard is a corner solution, .′ ′ ¯R** p R (S)
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ability b**. A less lenient program (a higher R) increases the probability of
conviction without hard evidence. This, in turn, raises the expected cost of
making type I errors and reduces the expected cost of making errors of type II.
However, in equilibrium the authority is ex post indifferent between convicting
and acquitting, and these two effects of b on welfare cancel each other out.18
Hence, welfare is independent of the level of R in this regime. By contrast, the
stipulated sanction S enters welfare through the deterrence level and the self-
reporting probability. Taking the derivative of (R, S) with respect to S, sub-W *2
stituting the equilibrium values, and rearranging yields
W *(R, S) E  E2 1 2
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆp ef(eS) h eS E (1 e) C(e) . (19)1[ ]S E 2
The first term in square brackets, , is the direct effect from an increaseˆh eS
in deterrence. The second term is the effect of S on the cost from judgment
errors.19 The last term is the effect of the sanction on the cost of investigation.20
As in the analysis of condition (10) in Section 4.2, the local maximizer is a
corner solution when the harm is sufficiently high such that themarginal¯S** p S
benefit of deterrence always dominates the marginal cost of increasing the sanc-
tion. Otherwise, the local maximizer is interior, . The next proposition¯S** ! S
compares the local maximizer of the two regimes and gives the globally optimal
policy (R**, S**) with this evidentiary standard.
Proposition 3. Suppose the authority can convict without hard evidence and
condition (15) holds. If the harm of the act is sufficiently small ( ), the′ ′h ! h
authority offers a more lenient policy and chooses not to convict without hard
evidence. Otherwise, for more harmful acts, she chooses a less lenient policy and
convicts without hard evidence. The optimal stipulated sanction is always maximal.
The authority’s optimal enforcement policy includes convictions without hard
evidence if and only if the harm of the act is sufficiently large. In these situations,
ex ante deterrence is relatively more important than ex post enforcement. This
favors a less lenient policy with respect to self-reporting in order to strengthen
investigation effort and deterrence. The optimal stipulated sanction is maximal,
as convictions without hard evidence are only globally optimal for high values
of h, and, thus, a corner solution obtains in this equilibrium regime.¯S** p S
18 From the definition of r** in equation (17), it follows that ˆ ˆ1 r** p E F(eS)/[E (1 F(eS))]1 2
and , and total welfare is invariant in Rˆ ˆ ˆW /b p (1 e){F(eS)E  [1 F(eS)](1 r**)E } p 02 1 2
for .′ ′R  (R , S]
19 In equilibrium, the expected costs of making errors of type I and type II are the same. Hence,
the combined cost of error in judgment is , which increases with the number ofF(eS)(1 e)E1
innocent individuals.
20 A higher value of S shifts the marginal individual from not committing (and being investigated
with a probability of 1) to the pool of violators who are investigated only if they are not self-reporting.
Thus, the cost of investigation increases in deterrence and S.
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6.3. Optimal Evidentiary Standard
Now compare the two evidentiary standards in terms of equilibrium behavior
and welfare under their respective, optimal self-reporting policies. First, consider
the equilibrium outcomes.
Figure 3 depicts equilibrium deterrence and self-reporting as a function of
the reduced sanction R. The dashed lines represent the values under the hard-
evidence standard; the bold lines denote the values when the authority can convict
without hard evidence.
Different cases arise as a function of the harm of the act. If the harm is less
than h′′, then the optimal policy is and the induced behavior′ ′ ¯R* p R** ≤ R (S)
is the same under both standards. When the authority uses the hard-evidence
standard and the harm is intermediate, the optimal reduced sanction is between
and . This reduces equilibrium self-reporting but increases investi-′ ′ ′¯ ¯R (S) R (S)
gation effort and deterrence. When the harm exceeds h′, then the optimal policy
implies such that there is no self-reporting and deterrence is capped′ ¯R* ≥ R (S)
at . By contrast, when the authority can convict without hard evidence and¯e¯S
the harm is greater than h′′, the optimal scheme implies . Instead of′ ′ ¯R** ≥ R (S)
increasing the investigation effort, the authority introduces convictions without
hard evidence. While convictions without hard evidence maintain the self-re-
porting incentives, they do not increase deterrence, which is capped at a lower
level. Hence, if the harm is larger than h′′, convictions without hard evidence
increase self-reporting but reduce the incentives to investigate and deterrence
relative to their levels under the hard-evidence standard.
Now compare ex ante welfare for . Two observations allow me to make′ ′h 1 h
a revealed-preference argument. First, if the authority can convict without hard
evidence, welfare is invariant in R for . Second, welfare at′ ′ ¯ ¯R  [R (S), S] R p
is the same under both standards. Hence, since for , it′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′¯ ¯R (S) R* 1 R (S) h 1 h
holds that
′ ′ ′ ′¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯W *(R*, S*) p W *(R*, S) 1 W *(R (S), S) p W *(R (S), S) p W *(R**, S**);1 1 1 2 2
that is, welfare is strictly higher with the hard-evidence standard. The comparative
advantage of the hard-evidence standard is that it provides a self-reporting
scheme with more leverage to deter individuals. When the harm of the act is
large, an authority can increase deterrence and welfare by making the self-
reporting scheme less attractive. This adjustment is not available when the au-
thority is able to use convictions without hard evidence. Raising the reduced
penalty only increases the frequency of convictions without hard evidence, which
has no effect on deterrence and ex ante expected welfare. This is summarized
as follows.
Proposition 4. Suppose condition (15) holds, and compare the two eviden-
tiary standards. If the harm of the act is small ( ), both standards yield′ ′h ≤ h
the same outcome and welfare. For more harmful acts, the hard-evidence stan-
dard is strictly welfare superior.
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Figure 3. Equilibrium values with different evidentiary standards
This result has clear-cut implications for the globally optimal enforcement
strategy with respect to self-reporting schemes and evidence standards. The op-
timal choice of the evidence standard does not affect the condition under which
it is efficient to use self-reporting schemes. If the harm of the act is small
( ), the authority optimally uses a self-reporting scheme and the hard-′h ≤ h
evidence standard. For more harmful acts, it is efficient not to offer a self-
reporting program and to enforce with deterrence and procedural investigation
using a hard-evidence standard.
7. Conclusions
Self-reporting programs have become a substantial part of law enforcement
in many circumstances from environmental protection to antitrust violations
and internal compliance within organizations. This paper analyzes self-reporting
and its optimal use in situations in which the authority is unable to commit to
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an ex post investigation effort. Two main conclusions arise. First, in contrast to
the case with commitment, it is not always efficient for an authority to use self-
reporting programs. A lack of commitment introduces a negative relationship
between the self-reporting rate and both the investigation effort and deterrence.
To induce individuals to self-report, the authority is required to weaken deter-
rence in order to provide a threat of ex post investigation and prosecution. This
introduces a cost that is particularly important when deterrence is more valuable.
Hence, when the harm of the act is sufficiently large, the authority is best off
not to use a self-reporting scheme and to rely on deterrence and procedural
investigation.
The difficulty of inducing self-reporting in the absence of commitment raises
the question as to whether the authority could do better by lowering the evi-
dentiary standard in order to strengthen the threat of prosecution. The second
main result of the paper asserts that this is not the case. While a weaker evidence
standard leads to more equilibrium self-reporting, it is an imperfect substitute
for investigation effort, as it introduces type I errors and innocent individuals
are wrongfully convicted. This has a negative, first-order effect on ex ante de-
terrence, which outweighs the positive effect of an increased threat of ex post
conviction. As a consequence, self-reporting programs are more effective in
conjunction with high evidentiary standards.
Overall, this paper provides novel insights with respect to the optimal design
of self-reporting programs. However, the results also suggest a somewhat cautious
approach toward the use of such schemes. The optimal design of a self-reporting
program crucially depends on whether the authority is able to commit to an
investigation effort ex ante. As discussed in the paper, the ability to commit is
a function of the institutional details of a given regulatory situation, in particular
with respect to the transparency of the process and the number and composition
of individuals. In the absence of such commitment, self-reporting schemes should
be implemented only for minor legal violations. Finally, the results are derived
in the framework of Kaplow and Shavell (1994). It is clear that relaxing the full-
commitment assumption might also have important consequences for the anal-
ysis of self-reporting programs in the context of remediation, self-policing, avoid-
ance activities, or targeted enforcement strategies. Exploration of these matters
is left for future research.
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Proof of Lemma 1
Suppose that . Then (B*, r*, e*) follows from equations (1), (2),0 ! r* ! 1
and (6). This equilibrium holds as long as orr* ≥ 0
′C (R/S) ≤ E [1 F(R)]. (A1)2
The left-hand side is strictly increasing, and the right-hand side is strictly de-
creasing in R. At , this condition always holds since . At′R p 0 C (0) ! E R p2
, because , the left-hand side is strictly larger than E2. It follows that
′S C (1) 1 E 2
there exists a unique R′ that satisfies the above condition as an equality and
above which the equilibrium in lemma 1.i fails to exist. From expression (A1)
and the definition of in the text, it follows that .′¯ ¯e R p eS
Suppose that . From equation (6), it follows that . From equation¯r* p 0 e* p e
(1), it has to hold that , and it follows from equation (2) thatR 1 e*S B* p
. This equilibrium holds for any .′ ¯e*S R 1 R p eS
Suppose that . Then, and . If , then there′r* p 1 R ! e*S g p 0/F(B) C (0) 1 0
is no solution to equation (6). If , then , which contradicts′C (0) p 0 e* p 0
.R ! e*S
The comparative statics follow from
′ ′r* E (R/S)F(r)C (R/S)2p 1 0,′ 2S S[1 F(R)][E  C (R/S)]2
′ ′ ′ ′r* S[(E  C (e*)]C (e*)f(R) E C (e*)[1 F(R)]F(R)2 2p  ! 0,′2 2R S[1 F(R)] [E  C (e*)]2
and, from totally differentiating equilibrium condition (6),
e* f(e*S)e*
p  ! 0.′ ′S Sf(e*S) C (e*)/E 2
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2
Total welfare (R, S) is a continuous, piecewise function with the twoW *1
regimes defined in lemma 1. For notational convenience, I denote the welfare
function and local maximizer of these regimes with an additional subscript 1
and 2, respectively. Further assume that this welfare function is piecewise concave
in (R, S). To find the global maximizer, I analyze the two local maximizers and
then compare. First note that the threshold value R′(S) satisfies ,′R (0) p 0
, and, from totally differentiating the equality of expression (A1),′ ¯ ¯R (S) ! S
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′ ′ ′dR RC (R/S)
p 1 0.′ ′2dS E S f(R) SC (R/S)2
Local Maximizer (R*1, S*1) for and . As derived in
′ ¯R  [0, R (S)] S  [0, S]
the text, . Simplifying equation (8) further yields¯S* p S1
W * E f(R)11 2 ′p (h R)f(R) [C(e*) (1 e*)C (e*)]′R E  C (e*)2 (A2)
′ ′E F(R)C (e*)2 [C(e*) (1 e*)E ] p 0.2′ 2S¯[E  C (e*)]2
Next calculate the value of this derivative at . At this cutoff, it′ ¯ ¯¯R p R (S) p eS
holds that . Substituting and rearranging yields′ ¯¯ ¯C (e) p [1 F(eS)]E 2
W *11 ¯ ¯¯ ¯ ¯′F p (h eS (1 e)E )f(eS)¯RpR (S) 2
R
′ ′¯ ¯¯ ¯ ¯ ¯[(1 e)E  C(e)][E Sf(eS) C (e)]2 2 .¯ ¯¯E SF(eS)2
This expression is negative for sufficiently small values of h, strictly increasing
in h, and positive for , where′h ≥ h
′ ′¯ ¯¯ ¯ ¯ ¯[(1 e)E  C(e)][E Sf(eS) C (e)]2 2′ ¯¯ ¯h { eS (1 e)E  .2 ¯ ¯ ¯¯ ¯E Sf(eS)F(eS)2
From concavity it follows that if , then there is an interior solution′h ! h
, where is implicitly defined by equation (A2) and satisfies¯˜ ˜(R* p R*, S* p S) R*1 1 1 1
. If , then the local maximizer is .′ ′ ′¯ ¯ ¯˜R*  [0, R (S)) h ≥ h (R* p R (S), S* p S)1 1 1
Local Maximizer for and . The term is′ ¯(R*, S*) R  [R (S), S] S  [0, S] W *2 2 12
independent of R in this region. From equation (10) it follows that if h !
, then , where is defined byˆ ¯ ˜ ¯ ˜¯ ¯h { eS (1 e)E S* p S* ! S S*2 2 2 2
˜ ˜ ˜h p e*(S*)S* [1 e*(S*)]E . (A3)2 2 2 2
Otherwise, if , then .ˆ ¯h ≥ h S* p S2
Global Maximizer. Note that . Suppose that such that′ˆ ˆh ! h h ! h R* p1
and . From and concavity it follows that′ ′¯ ˜ ¯˜R* ≤ R (S) S* p S* ! S dR /dS 1 01 2 2
′ ′¯ ˜ ¯ ˜ ˜W *(R*, S* p S) ≥ W *(R (S*), S) 1 W *(R (S*), S*) p W *(R*, S*),11 1 1 11 2 11 2 2 12 2 2
and the local maximizer of regime i strictly dominates. Then suppose that h ≥
and . It holds thatˆ ¯h S* p S2
′¯ ¯ ¯W *(R*, S* p S) ≥ W *(R (S), S) p W *(R*, S*).11 1 1 11 12 2 2
The first inequality is strict if and only if ; that is, .′ ′ˆ ¯˜h  [h, h ) R* p R* ≤ R (S)1 1
In this case, the local maximizer of regime i strictly dominates. Otherwise, the
local maximums of the two regimes are the same. The proposition follows. Q.E.D.
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Proof of Lemma 2
Suppose that . This yields the equilibrium of lemma 1 and holds asb** p 0
long as . The posterior belief g in this equilibrium increases in R and takesˆg ≤ g
its highest value, , for . Define the threshold value as′ ˆ¯1 F(eS) R ≥ R S 1
. Thus, if or , then the equilibrium from lemmaˆ ˆ¯ ¯ˆ ˆF(eS) p g 1 F(eS) ≤ g S ≥ S
1 exists for all values of . In particular, if , then the equilibrium′R ≤ S R ≤ R
from part i holds; if , then the equilibrium from part ii exists. Now assume′R 1 R
that or . An equilibrium with as defined inˆ¯ ˆ1 F(eS) 1 g S ! S r** p r* 1 0
lemma 1.i exists for values of R such that the posterior belief satisfies g p
. Denote R′′ as the value that satisfies this condition with equality.′ ˆC (R/S)/E ≤ g2
Since R′ is defined by , it holds that if or′ ′ ¯ ¯ˆC (R /S)/E p 1 F(eS) g ≤ 1 F(eS)2
, then . This also implies that an equilibrium with as′ ′ ′ˆS ≤ S R (S) ≤ R (S) r p 0
in lemma 1.ii does not exist for or .ˆ¯ ˆ1 F(eS) 1 g S ! S
Suppose that . From the argument in the text it has to hold that0 ! b** ≤ 1
, and from equation (12) it follows that or . First,′ ˆˆ ˆg p g g p C (e)/E e** p e2
consider situations in which equation (13) holds and the conviction probability
is given by equation (16). A nonnegative probability requires that ′ ′R ≥ R p
. From equations (14) and (5) follow and r** in equation (17). Toˆ ˆeS B** p eS
ensure that , it has to hold that . Remember the definitionsˆˆr** ≥ 0 g ≤ 1 F(eS)
of , , and of , . Since is decreasing′ ′¯ ¯ ¯ ˆ ˆˆe 1 F(eS) p C (e)/E e g p C (e)/E 1 F(eS)2 2
in e and is increasing in e, it follows that if and only if ,′ ¯ˆC (e)/E g ≤ 1 F(eS)2
or , then . This implies that, when , it holds thatˆ ˆ ¯ ˆ ¯ ˆS ≤ S e ≤ e e ≤ e g p
. Hence, such an equilibrium exists if and .′ ′ ′ ˆˆ ˆC (e)/E ≤ 1 F(eS) R 1 R S ≤ S2
Second, check situations in which violators have a strict incentive to self-report,
, such that and . This implies that , andR ! [e (1 e)b]S r** p 1 g p 0 b p 0
from equation (12) it follows that . This, however, does not satisfy thee p 0
self-reporting constraint for any . Hence, such an equilibrium does notR ≥ 0
exist. Finally, consider situations in which violators have no incentive to self-
report, and . This implies that andˆR 1 [e (1 e)b]S r** p 0 B** p eS g p
. The latter is feasible only if , where and .′ ′ ′ˆˆ ˆ ¯ˆ1 F(eS) p g S p S e p e R p R
Thus, at these parameter values, this case is equivalent with lemma 1.ii.
Summary. If , then , and the equilibrium from lemma 1ˆ ¯S ≤ S ≤ S b* p 0
holds. If and , then , and the equilibrium from lemma 1.i′ ′ˆS ! S R ≤ R b* p 0
holds. If and , then and the equilibrium given in lemma 2.ii′ ′ˆS ! S R 1 R b* 1 0
holds. Finally, note that if and only if . This is conditionˆ ¯ ¯¯ ˆS ≥ S 1 F(eS) ≥ g
(15) in the text, and lemma 2 follows. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3
Assume that is a continuous, piecewise concave function with theW *(R, S)2
two regimes defined in lemma 2. Let and denote welfare inW *(R, S) W *(R, S)21 22
regime i and regime ii, respectively.
Local Maximizer for and . From the equi-′ ′ ¯(R**, S**) R  [0, R (S)] S  [0, S]1 1
librium analysis it follows that , and from proposition 2 itW *(R, S) p W *(R, S)21 11
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holds that . It further follows from the first-order condition (A2)¯S** p S* p S1 1
that the optimal R increases in h. Hence, since , there exists a unique′ ′ ′R (S) ! R (S)
h′′, with , such that if , then an interior solution with′ ′ ′ ′ ′0 ! h ! h h ! h R** p1
exists. To derive the cutoff value h′′, calculate condition (A2) at′ ′˜R* p R* ! R1 1
using and . From′ ′ ′¯ ˆ ˆR p R (S) e** p e C (e) p E E /(E  E ) W */R(R p1 2 1 2 21
it follows that′ ′ ¯R (S)) p 0
′ ′2 ¯
ˆ ˆ ˆE  E (E  E ) [(1 e)E  C(e)]F(eS)C (e)1 2 1 2 2′ ′ ¯
ˆ ˆ ˆh { eS (1 e)E  C(e) .1 3¯E E S2 2
Otherwise, if , the local maximizer is .′ ′ ′ ′ ¯ ¯h ≥ h (R** p R (S), S** p S)1 1
Local Maximizer for and . From the def-′ ′ ¯(R**, S**) R  [R (S), S] S  [0, S]2 2
inition of r** in equation (17), it follows that 1 r** p E F(eS)/[E (11 2
, which implies thatF(eS))]
W2
ˆ ˆ ˆp (1 e)[F(eS)E  (1 F(eS))(1 r**)E ] p 0.1 2
b
Thus, total welfare is invariant in this regime. For the same reason, the indirect
welfare effect of S via b is 0. Moreover, the optimal effort is independent ofeˆ
S, and we get
W r**
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆp (h eS)ef(eS) (1 e)E ef(eS) r**ef(eS) (1 F(eS)) C(e)2 [ ]S S
r**
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ (1 e)(1 b**)E (1 r**)ef(eS) (1 F(eS)) .2[ ]S
To simplify and obtain equation (19), check that ˆr**/S p eE f(eS)/[E (11 2
and substitute in r** and b** from lemma 2.ii. Verify from equation2F(eS)) ]
(19) that if , then an interior maxi-˜ ¯ˆ ˆ ˆh ! h { eS E (1 e) (E  E )C(e)/E1 1 2 2
mizer exists where is defined by˜ ¯ ˜S** p S** ! S S**2 2 2
E  E1 2
˜
ˆ ˆ ˆeS** p h E (1 e) C(e).2 1 E 2
If , then .˜ ¯h ≥ h S** p S2
Global Maximizer. First, note that . Suppose that such that an′ ′˜ ˜h ! h h ! h
interior local maximizer for regime ii exists. From concavity and the˜S** p S**2 2
fact that is independent of R, it follows thatW *22
′ ′ ′ ′¯ ¯W *(R**, S) ≥ W *(R (S**), S) 1 W *(R (S**), S**)21 1 21 2 21 2 2
′ ′p W *(R (S**), S**) p W *(R**, S**),22 2 2 22 2 2
and the local maximizer of regime i strictly dominates. Next consider such˜h ≥ h
that the local maximizer of regime ii is at . Check that¯S** p S2
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′ ′ ′ ′¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯W *(R**, S) ≥ W *(R (S), S) p W *(R (S), S) p W *(R**, S** p S).21 1 21 22 22 2 2
If , then the local maximizer of regime i is at , and the first′ ′ ′ ′ ¯h ! h R** ! R (S)1
inequality is strict. In this case, the local maximizer of regime i strictly dominates
the local maximizer of regime ii. If , then the local maximums of the two′ ′h ≥ h
regimes are the same. The proposition follows. Q.E.D.
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